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PROXIMATE CAUSE IN NEGLIGENCE-A RETREAT
FROM "RATIONALIZATION"
CaARTES 0. GREGORY*THIS article is not an attempt either to state the alleged principles
of proximate cause or to further in any way the illusion that there
is a generally recognized and understood set of such principles.
It is, rather, an attempt to outline the considerations entertained by
courts in determining the extension of liability for negligence and to ex-
plore critically typical judicial techniques employed in such a process.
Although the suppositions in the first part of the article are not strictly
accurate in the light of history, they adequately suggest early considera-
tions of policy involved in the extension or restriction of liability for negli-
gence. Since the discussion is concerned primarily with negligence litiga-
tion, J have included a brief account of the negligence issue as a back-
ground for the balance of the article.
I
Suppose a society in which the wise men governing it adopt the general
principle that all who cause harm to others shall be made to answer for it.
This working principle they proceed to enforce, whether the harm is in-
tended or not, and judgments are given requiring compensation for the
harm caused. No special consideration, however, is given to the fault of
the defendant, since it is felt that as between him who causes the harm
and him who suffers it, the former ought to stand the loss rather than the
latter. The courts are soon confronted, however, with a type of case in
which they believe that the harm complained of, although certainly a
causal consequence of the defendant's conduct, is too attenuated, too far
removed from the conduct of the defendant, to make imposition of
liability politic. They can be imagined saying: "The plaintiff asks too
much. Surely the fathers did not intend us to go so far. Literal application
of the principle of liability adopted above would place too great a burden
on the everyday conduct of people and, above all, would seriously affect
business enterprise. We must qualify this principle of causation."
Presently it is observed that plaintiffs are losing cases in spite of a clear
showing that the defendant's conduct contributed to their damage in the
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sense that "but for" this conduct, they would have suffered no harm.
But the courts are not anxious to reveal their perplexity or to indicate
why they are hedging on the original principle of liability. They proceed
to devise a rule which they believe will produce more satisfactory results
and justify it on considerations of convenience, establishing the impres-
sion, however, that this qualifying rule is, in the nature of things, implicit
in the original principle of liability itself.
This hedging device is the pronouncement that the fathers did not mean
all causal consequences of a defendant's conduct to be actionable. They
meant, rather, only those consequences which were fairly direct or im-
mediate, since it is apparent that courts cannot pursue cause and effect
indefinitely. They would never get anything done if they did! The courts,
therefore, enunciate the qualification of the original principle that the law
will look at only the "proximate" and not the "remote" consequences of
the defendant's conduct., This is sufficiently broad to allow great latitude
for interpretation. The courts, indeed, soon discover that this qualifying
principle is effective not only in deciding causation problems but also in
concealing grave and delicate issues of policy as well. Before long, the
courts are using this formula of proximate cause and consequence to
explain decisions conventionally thought of as involving the duty issue.
It is noteworthy, however, that the courts always retain the original prin-
ciple of causation in its full vigor when it appears that the defendant in-
tended the harm which ensued.2
In such a society as we have supposed, a considerable space in the law
books becomes devoted to the principles of proximate cause. The courts
have handled hundreds of nice problems of policy in cases involving all
sorts of ordinary and weird fact situations; but the material with which
they have dealt is so heterogeneous and internally unrelated that they
have not been able to devise any general propositions which are helpful
in predicting results in future cases and at the same time retain some
semblance of what has conventionally become to be thought of as law and
legal principles. Indeed, so many odd decisions on matters of social policy
of all sorts have been disposed of in the name of proximate cause, that the
judges become unable even to state generally what the issue of proximate
cause is, much less to state the rules of proximate cause as a guide to the
I "In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur. It were infinite for the law to judge
the causes of causes, and their impulsions one of another; therefore it contenteth it selfe with
the immediate cause, and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree."
Bacon, Maxims I.
2 But consideration of "proximate cause" except in negligence cases is beyond the scope of
this discussion.
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future. And the matter is not improved by the dozens of attempts by legal
scholars, most of them like myself, writing from the side-lines, to state the
issue clearly and to propound the answers succinctly. 3
During this development, let us suppose, the courts became impressed
with the idea that social movement and enterprise and the ownership of
land would be less stifled and onerous if liability for harm caused thereby
were made to depend not on mere causation but on the manner of such
conduct and maintenance of ownership. The notion emerges that a person
should not be held liable for the consequences of his conduct unless he is
found to have been what the courts call negligent. Close on the heels of
this development follows another hedging device to the effect that the
defendant cannot be held accountable for harm he causes unless he was
under a duty to refrain from the alleged negligence causing it. This gives
the court a tremendous control of litigation, since it can always interpret
any situation in terms of duty. In stereotyped and highly repetitive fact
situations, such as traffic on highways, where the duty to take care is
always conceded, everyone will become so habituated to the requirement
of care that the duty to refrain from negligence will be taken for granted
and the duty issue, as such, will disappear. Likewise, where recovery is
always denied in certain fact situations, such as actions by trespassers
hurt by the condition of land, everyone will accept the position without
question that there is no duty to refrain from the negligence alleged. The
emphasis then will be placed on the inquiry before the court whether or
not particular fact situations fall within or without the accepted cate-
gories of duty. Courts will find considerable latitude by interpretation to
expand or contract either category in response to what it considers social
need to be and, moreover, will be able to dispose of nice issues of policy in
the name of duty just as they have been doing under the issue of proxi-
mate cause.4
3 E.g., Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 223, 303 (1911-12),
reprinted in Selected Essays on the Law of Torts, 649 el seq. (1924); Bohlen, The Probable
or the Natural Consequence as the Test of Liability in Negligence, 47 Am. L. Reg. (4o N.S.)
79, 48 (igoi), reprinted in Studies in Torts x (1926); Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning
"Legal Cause" at Common Law, 9 Col. L. Rev. 16, 136 (19o9); Edgerton, Legal Cause,
72 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 211, 343 (1924); Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33
Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1920); Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927); McLaughlin, Proxi-
mate Cause, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149 (1925); Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proxi-
mate Cause, 20 Calif. L. Rev. 229, 396, and 471 (1932).
4 E.g., Cardozo, J., in McPherson v. Buick Co., 217 N.Y. 382, iio N.E. io5o (1916).
See also Cardozo, J., in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). In
this latter case the defendant accountant negligently prepared a balance sheet for S company
which S used to obtain credit from plaintiff. The court achieved protection from liability for
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Naturally, the courts adapt to the negligence concept of liability these
techniques employed for the purpose of imposing or denying recovery.
Henceforth a person can not be held liable unless he is negligent, unless he
is under a duty to refrain from negligence or to exercise due care under the
circumstances in litigation, and unless his negligence is the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's damage or, conversely, the damage is the proximate
consequence of the negligence.
II
Negligence soon became a dominant concept in the law, the meaning
and content of which everyone who had anything to do with law as-
sumed he understood. When lawyers talked about negligence, they took
it for granted that they were all talking about the same thing. But this
was not so clear, since some of them regarded negligence as involving fault
and a sort of moral shortcoming, whereas many of them defined it merely
as careless conduct or lack of care under the circumstances or conduct
which diverged from the standards of care observed by reasonable and
prudent men. Some others have thought that negligence is rather a tacti-
cal counter in a process of litigation and prefer to think of it in light of
what happens in a law suit before a judge and jury. They consider it from
the judges point of view as evidence upon which he permits the jury, un-
der the negligence issue, to impose liability, and from the jury's point of
view merely as evidence justifying the liability. This attitude is prompted,
no doubt, by the many instances of cases submitted to juries in which the
evidence indicates that defendant had behaved no differently from most of
his fellow-men but that someone had nevertheless been hurt. But even
under this view of negligence the courts have some standard of reasonable
conduct which is, presumably, the manner in which most people behave
under similar circumstances. Occasionally the court itself draws the final
inference of negligence vel non. When it does this, it is evaluating the
defendant's conduct to determine whether or not it justifies the imposi-
tion of liability. When the court lets the case go to the jury, it permits the
negligence by concluding that the duty of care in making verbal or written representations
for another to use with third parties was confined to those situations where the careless mis-
representation would be used to affect a definite or limited class of people. It said that only
"fraudulent" misrepresentations would be actionable where the class to be affected was in-
definite in number; but the court took a rather large view of what might be considered "fraud."
Compare the recent case of State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, ir N.E. (2d) 416
(1938), noted in 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 127, in which the same court (two justices dissenting) con-
sidered a serious error in judgment on the part of an accountant in a similar case to be "gross
negligence" and thus tantamount to "fraud" within the meaning of that word in the Ultra-
mares case.
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jury to do the evaluating.5 Even this is not all, since the court may if it
wishes to in appropriate cases submit the issue of "gross negligence" to
the jury when consideration of that issue becomes a vital factor in estab-.
lishing the defendant's liability.6
It became the vogue to speak of the negligence issue as a "mixed issue
of law and fact" for the court and jury.7 But this is very confusing ter-
minology. It implies, what is frequently asserted, that negligence is an
issue of law and/or an issue of fact. The arguments to support the view
that it is an issue of law are (i) that courts sometimes make the inference
of negligence vel non and since courts pass on issues of law, therefore
negligence is an issue of law, and (2) that when a negligence case is sub-
mitted to the jury, it is up to the jury to decide whether liability shall be
imposed or not, and imposition of liability is a matter of law. Arguments
to support the view that it is an issue of fact are (i) that a defendant either
is or is not negligent and whether he is or not is a matter of fact, and (2)
that this issue is ordinarily submitted for final disposition to a jury, and
the jury being a fact-finding body, what it passes on are issues of fact.
Actually it does not make a bit of difference whether we call the neg-
ligence issue one of law or of fact or neither. What happens to the neg-
ligence issue before a court and jury is what matters. The court always
scrutinizes the evidence to determine whether or not it is safe to permit
a jury of laymen to hold a defendant liable for what he did or failed to do.
As many people frequently describe this step, the court determines from
the evidence whether or not a jury of laymen may reasonably draw the
inference of negligence or no negligence from the evidence submitted. If
the court believes that the evidence reasonably justifies the inference of
liability-that there is some item of evidence on which liability may
justifiably be hung by a group of laymen-it submits the case to the jury
on the negligence issue. If it feels otherwise, it directs a verdict for the
defendant. If the court is sitting without a jury it draws the final in-
ference itself. But whoever draws it, it seems plain that this is an evaluat-
ing process and in its nature is not much different from judging a beauty
5 On the nature of negligence see Holmes, The Common Law, io8 et seq. (i88i), and the
admirable essays of Seavey, Negligence, Subjective or Objective, 41 Harv. L. Rev. x (1927);
Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference: The Relation of Mental States to Neg-
ligence, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (1926).
6 Cf., e.g., State Street Bank v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. io4, I5 N.E. (2d) 416 (1938), discussed in
note 4 supra.
7As to this phrase, see Bohlen's excellent treatment in Mixed Questions of Law and Fact,
72 U. of Pa. L. Rev. I (19Q4), reprinted in Studies in Torts 6oi (1926).
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contest or a competition among musicians. The conclusion, whatever it
be, is not a fact conclusion; it is a value judgment.
A signiflcant feature of the administration of negligence litigation is the
traditional judicial distrust of juries. Courts exercise a very strong con-
trol over the well-recognized vagaries of the jury in deciding whether or
not cases should be submitted to it. They have to exercise this control,
because if the jury were always permitted to pass on the negligence issue,
there is no telling what factors might move it to bring in a verdict for the
plaintiff, in spite of elaborate instructions to guide it. Courts know very
well that juries are inclined to be sympathetic to plaintiffs and less so to
defendants and that laymen do not judge cases from a broad, general view
of policy but rather from the apparent exigencies of the particular case.
When, however, a court believes that there is enough in the evidence to
support the imposition of liability, it submits the case to the jury knowing
full well that its verdict may be impelled not by a consideration of the
factors which the judge exhorts it to depend on but by entirely extra-
legal and prejudicial items. Under the accepted system, it is proper for
the jury to use its own judgment as long as it has received correct in-
structions and returns its verdict in the formally approved manner. A
better control could be exercised by requiring special verdicts or findings
from the jury on particular questions. Its response to questions on the
negligence issue would still be speculative; but at least it would be diffi-
cult for the jury to take the bit in its teeth and run away in the plaintiff's
favor regardless of the evidence.
III
Assuming an appreciation of the so-called negligence issue, it becomes
necessary to examine in some detail the other devices mentioned above
which the courts have associated with liability for negligence and which
they employ to control litigation before a court and jury. These devices
we may label, for convenience, the issues of "duty" and of "proximate
cause." It was suggested that to some extent they may be used inter-
changeably by the courts. The duty issue is admittedly a matter for the
court alone to pass on. When it decides to submit a case to the jury, it has
decided this issue in favor of the plaintiff. Thus, in an action by a fireman
against a landowner for harm suffered from an alleged careless condition
of defendant's land while he was on it in pursuance of his calling, most
courts would direct a verdict immediately for the defendant before the
submission of evidence. They would say that admitting plaintiff's con-
tentions, he cannot recover because the landowner was under no "duty of
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care" toward a "licensee" entering his premises, to keep the land in
careful condition. On this matter the court does not want the jury's opin-
ion. This is a matter of general policy or, if you will, of "law," to be de-
cided by the court alone. If a court decides to take a different view of this
matter, it expands the field of duty and lets the fireman get to the jury
on the issues of negligence and cause in fact.8 Or take another well-
known situation. The courts have decided that one who is hurt by a de-
fect in a manufactured product may not get to the jury in a negligence
action against the manufacturer unless he can show privity of contract,
i.e., that he bought the article directly from the defendant rather than
from some intermediate distributor. They say that no duty of care exists
in the absence of this privity of contract. In one of the most famous deci-
sions asserting this point of view, the court gilded the lily by pointing out
that unless privity of contract were present, the negligence, if any, was
not the "proximate cause" of the plaintiff's harm. 9 This observation was
suggested by the statement that it is not foreseeable to a manufacturer
that anyone not in privity of contract will be endangered. The inanity of
this statement was stressed in the leading decision expanding the duty of
the manufacturer.'0 Yet the case remains as an example of the use of both
devices by the court as a means of keeping the plaintiff from the jury.
The most important part of this discussion, however, is what the courts
have done with the other control device, the so-called issue of proximate
cause. Perhaps a more accurate label is the issue of extension of liability
for negligence. As might be expected with an issue into which so many
considerations of policy as well as some intricate questions of cause in fact
have been crowded, courts in various jurisdictions seem to differ very
much from each other in their manner of talking about and deciding cases
under this issue." For purposes of convenience only, I am going to label
these apparently .different views concerning the same issue. Eventually,
I hope to show that the issue of proximate cause, at least as I regard the
content of that term, is not at all the same issue for court and jury. Before
discussing the transmission of the so-called jury issue of proximate cause
to the jury, I am going to discuss the issue of proximate cause with which
the court alone is concerned.
S Meiers v. Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
9 Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 12o Fed. 865 (C.C.A. 8th i9o3).
"McPherson v. Buick Co., 217 N.Y. 382, i1o N.E. io5o (i9z6).
"See the counsel of despair in the opinion of Wheeler, C. J., in Mahoney v. Beatman, iio
Conn. 184, 147 Ati. 762 (1929). But Heard, J., in Illinois Central Ry. v. Oswald, 338 IIl. 270,
17o N.E. 247 (193o) does not seem to think there is much doubt or confusion.
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An appellate court in any jurisdiction has to decide how far-reaching it
is going to make imposition of liability for negligence. Presumably it will
subscribe to the common law on this subject, which is that a defendant is
liable for the proximate consequences of his negligence. The court then
has to decide what it is going to read into the words "proximate conse-
quences." There is reason to believe, for instance, that the English courts
have finally adopted the view that a defendant should be held liable for all
harm actually caused by his negligence. Their approach is alleged to be
as follows: The evidence of the defendant's conduct is scrutinized by the
court to see whether the inference of negligence of some or any sort might
be drawn, and in making this determination the court considers whether
or not harm of any sort might reasonably have been foreseeable; but if
there is a justifiable basis in the evidence for the inference of negligence
and of causal connection in fact, the case will go to the jury even if the
ultimate harm complained of or the hazard from which it arose was en-
tirely unforeseeable. This I shall call the English view. It is supposed to
have been established in the cases of Smith v. R. R.,I 3 In re Polemis'4 and
Hambrook v. Stokes. 5 Thus in the Polemis case, the defendant's servant
dropped a heavy plank in the hold of plaintiff's ship. The plank caused a
spark in landing, which ignited benzine vapor and several tins of benzine
in the hold, the entire ship being destroyed by fire. Arbitrators to whom
the case was submitted for a report found that dropping the plank was
negligent in that some harm to the ship, workmen and cargo was fore-
seeable but that the spark and fire were not foreseeable consequences.
The court nevertheless imposed liability. 6
At the other extreme is what I shall call for lack of a better name the
Pennsylvania view, 7 albeit that court has probably retreated consider-
ably from it in late years. 8 This view is supposed to be that even if the
12 There is some question whether or not the English courts will require that there must
have been negligence of some sort toward some interest of the plaintiff. A hint of this appears
in the opinion of Atkin, L. J., in Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K. B. 141. See my discussion,
P. 54 ilfra.
13 L. R. 5 C. P. 98 (1870); L. R. 6 C. P. I4 (1870).
14 [1921] K . B. 56o. '5 [I925] I K. B. 141.
,61t should be noted that this suit arose out of an arbitration concerning defendant's
liability under a charter-party which provided that the defendant would not be responsible for
damage to the ship by fire.
X7 The "natural and probable consequence" rule, as it is sometimes called.
A8 Compare Hoag v. Lake Shore R. R., 85 Pa. 293 (1877) with Pittsburgh F. & I. Co. v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 272 Pa. 118, 116 Atl. 147 (1922) and with Wood v. PennsylvaniaR. R.
177 Pa. 3o6,35 Atl. 699 (1896), Mellon v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 282 Pa. 39, 127 At. 444 (1925).
See also New York Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Rataj, 73 F. (2d) 184 (C.C.A. 3d 1934).
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defendant was negligent in some respects and even if that negligence was
in fact causally contributive to the harm complained of, the court will
nevertheless direct a verdict for the defendant if in its opinion the even-
tuality complained of was not a foreseeable incident of the defendant's
negligent conduct, i.e., was a rather weird and improbable occurrence.
Leading repositories of this view are Hoag v. Lake Shore R. R.' 9 and Wood
v. Pennsylvania R. R.20 In the former case an engineer carelessly ran a
train of tank cars loaded with oil into a landslide, derailing the train.
Upset oil ignited from the coals of the engine and, flowing into an adjacent
brook, was carried down stream several hundred yards where it ignited
overhanging grass in plaintiff's field from which, in turn, the fire spread
to and destroyed a building. In the second case an engineer of a through
train approached a crossing at sixty miles per hour without giving any
warning signals and struck a woman, the force hurling her body through
the air so that it hit the plaintiff while he stood on a nearby station plat-
form. The Pennsylvania court held that each of these cases should have
been decided for the defendant on a directed verdict.
An intermediate view, which I shall somewhat guardedly call the Car-
dozo view for lack of a better name, requires that for liability in negligence
the general hazard or danger which brings about the harm complained of
must have been reasonably foreseeable, although the way in which it
manifested itself in the occurrence of harm to the plaintiff might have
been quite weird and improbable. A leading example of this view is the
famous Palsgraf case." In that case the evidence indicated that defend-
ant's guard and conductor so carelessly pushed a prospective passenger
onto a moving train as to endanger the passenger's interest in his own
welfare and in a package he carried. At any rate, the package was dis-
lodged from his arm and fell on the tracks. Since it happened to contain
fireworks, it blew up and the concussion broke a cracked scales at the
other end of the platform so that part of it fell on Mrs. Palsgraf, the
plaintiff, who was standing beside it.22 She was far removed from the
scene of foreseeable danger, by thirty or forty feet, and since there was
obviously no reason why defendant's servants should have expected the
'9 85 Pa. 293 (i877). 2o 177 Pa. 3o6, 35 Atl. 699 (i896).
21 Palsgraf v. The Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, x62 N.E. 9g (1928).
" One cannot help wondering what would have happened had Mrs. Palsgraf stressed the
weakened condition of the scales as the negligence upon which she based her action. Perhaps
she might have shown that it was a constant danger to waiting passengers like herself, in view
of the many loud noises and vibrations normal in railroading that might have furnished a
sufficient shock to make the scales fall without the added effect of the explosion which actually
occurred.
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package to contain explosives, they could not foresee that a hazard might
be created that would take effect at such a distance away. The trial court
sent the case to the jury and the Appellate Division affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff.23 But the Court of Appeals in a four to three decision
reversed the judgment and said that a verdict should have been directed
for the defendant railroad.
Although the facts in this case and the social situation behind them are
quite different, it involves much the same general sort of problem as the
carrier cases in which a railroad negligently fails to forward goods on time
and they are destroyed by some entirely unforeseeable holocaust such as a
flood or fire. The foreseeable damage which renders the conduct negligent
is the probability of commercial loss or other inconvenience to the shipper
or consignee from the delay. The damage is a result not of this fore-
seeable hazard of commercial inconvenience but of the unforeseeable
hazard. And yet, but for the negligent delay, the harm would never have
occurred because the goods would not have been there to be destroyed.
Some courts have imposed liability here; others have denied it. Decisions
both ways are rationalized under the concept of proximate cause.24
It seems clear that Cardozo writing the majority opinion in the Palsgraf
case took his cue from decisions of this general sort denying liability. If
the defendant's servants had known, or from the evidence had had
reason to know, what was in the package, negligence with respect to the
hazard achieving the damage complained of would probably have been
sufficiently apparent to permit submission of the case to the jury. Car-
dozo did not say this; he talked of negligence as a concept of relationship
and said that the case could not go to the jury since the evidence in no
way indicated that the defendant's servants had been negligent toward
the plaintiff. He said that if the defendant's servants had known about
the explosive in the package, then their conduct with reference to it would
have related their negligence to all people within the probable area of the
foreseeable explosion including the plaintiff. He added that the issue of
proximate causation was foreign to the case, and many readers have there-
fore supposed that the issue in the case was different from that commonly
travelling under that name. These readers say that Cardozo was simply
declaring that negligence is a term of relationship-that you "can't have
negligence in the air, so to speak"-and a defendant cannot be held liable
unless it appears that he was negligent toward or in relation to the
23 222 App. Div. i66, 225 N.Y. Supp. 412 (1927).
24 Compare Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atcheson, T. & S. Ry., 94 Minn. 269, 102 N.W. 709
(19o5) and Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Mullen, 7o Fla. 450, 70 So. 467 (19,5).
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plaintiff. This, of course, is just a quarrel over words. Naturally it may
be assumed as axiomatic that negligence is a term of relationship. There
was ample evidence in the Palsgraf case to show that the defendant's
servants were negligent, i.e., to warrant a jury's inference to that effect. 5
But this negligence was toward the interests of the prospective passenger
who ran for the train and not toward people as far away as the plaintiff.
Therefore, if we conclude that Cardozo's view is that negligence is not
actionable in spite of causation in fact (i) unless the hazard resulting in
the harm complained of is reasonably foreseeable, or (2) unless it (the
negligence) is relative to the plaintiff, we are concluding substantially the
same thing under different sets of words.26
Andrews, writing the dissent in the Palsgraf case, thought it was
properly submitted to the jury, since he felt that there was evidence of
some negligence toward someone, i.e., the prospective passenger, which
apparently in fact causally contributed to the harm. His view of the ex-
tension of liability for negligence is approximately the same as the English
view, except that he thinks the line should be drawn somewhere in some
cases. He does not tell us where it is to be drawn. Concerning this de-
termination he makes the following remark: "What we do mean by the
word proximate is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics."
But it is a drastic qualification of the English rule, nevertheless. This
we shall call the Andrew's view.
Now before I discuss these views outlined above, I wish to add another
view of proximate cause which I shall call the "Intervening Agency"
view. This arises out of the type of case where the defendant's negligence
paves the way for a human or other agency either criminally, negligently,
or pursuant to the laws of nature, to introduce the effective means of
causing the harm. For an instance,27 the defendant is making repairs in
2S The case was submitted to the jury which found negligence, and Cardozo apparently did
not deny that there may have been negligence toward the prospective passenger.
26 It has been argued that if negligence were relative to the plaintiff's interests, the harm is
actionable under Cardozo's opinion even if caused by a hazard not foreseeable. Thus, it is
claimed, Cardozo would also have decided the Polemis case for the plaintiff, even assuming
that the arbitrators' findings of fact were binding. I do not believe this is so at all, and I think
Cardozo very carefully refrained from committing himself on this apparently logical implica-
tion of deciding that a plaintiff can recover only for damages caused by negligence toward him-
self. He declared that a defendant is not liable to a plaintiff toward whom he was not negligent,
not that a defendant is liable to everyone toward whom he is negligent. There is a difference;
and I think this difference can be found in my analysis of Cardozo's view.
27 Andrews v. kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S.E. 300 (i9ox). Cf. Brower v. N.Y.C & H. Ry., 91
N.J..L 19o, io3 AtI. i66 (i918).
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the plaintiff's house in the plaintiff's absence and leaves the front door
open when he goes home from work. After dark someone enters and rifles
the plaintiff's house. Although what might have been expected from the
obvious danger of leaving the door open is exactly what happened, many
courts conclude that the defendant should not be held answerable for an
intervening, independent human act which, they say, was the proximate
cause of the damage, the defendant's negligence being a remote cause.
As can be seen, this technique is more a rule of thumb than a view.
IV
These different approaches to the extension of liability for negligence
represent different views of policy concerning the desirable legal incidence
of negligence. The only one of these views that seems to be clear-cut and
fairly understandable is the alleged English view. Courts enunciating this
view feel that if a person is negligent and if his negligence causes the harm
complained of in the sense that it wouldn't have happened but for the
negligence, then as between the innocent sufferer of damage and the
negligent defendant, the latter ought to bear the loss by way of com-
pensation.28 If this is the English view, I believe it is understandable and
fairly easy to apply. The only difficult feature of it is common to all views
and to all negligence cases-the determination by the court that there is
evidence from which a jury might safely be permitted to draw the in-
ferences of negligence and cause in fact. The policy feature disregarding
the unforeseeability of the hazard actually resulting from the negligence
and giving rise to the harm in suit is certainly defensible in every way.
If any of us is accustomed to a different and less comprehensive view of
extension of liability, he may prefer that view to the English rule, but
he cannot say it is any better. This judgment lies in the realm of values,
and what you choose depends upon what you want. The English judges
apparently want a broad rule of liability for what they conceive to be
negligence.29
Cardozo on the other hand seems to disagree fundamentally with the
policy behind the English view. He remarks that it is liability for neg-
ligence which is in issue and this implies an opportunity to have been
careful in avoiding what is complained of. He regards "what is com-
plained of" as the hazard giving rise to the harm as well as the harm
29 Compare the statement in Smith v. Lampe, 64 F. (2d) 201, 203 (C.C.A. 6th 1933), as fol-
lows: "There is a respectable and growing body of authority for the rule that reasonable an-
ticipation of injury is important only in determining negligence, while the natural course of
events is the test of required causation."
29 See Atkin, L. J., in the Hambrook case: "The full effect of the decision in In re Polemis
.... has not yet, I think, been fully realized, even though that case laid down no new law."
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itself. And if the evidence indicates clearly that the defendant could not
have foreseen the hazard which actually brought about the harm in suit,
then he was not negligent in not avoiding this hazard. Cardozo makes it
dear that he does not mind holding a defendant liable for the highly un-
likely and weird consequences of his conduct as long as the general type of
hazard or danger bringing about those consequences was reasonably fore-
seeable.
This view would prevent liability for negligence in several cases where
it would be allowed under the English view. But who can say that this
is the true or correct view or that it is better than the English approach?
As a matter of fact, from the point of view of administrative facility it
is less desirable than the English view, since it is so much less easy of
application. In the first place, Cardozo did not state his view very dearly,
inasmuch as he said enough to make many people believe that he would
let a case go to the jury as long as there was evidence of some kind of
negligence toward the plaintiff, although the evidence also indicated that
the plaintiff was not hurt by the foreseeable hazard but by a hazard or
danger which was not reasonably foreseeable. I must admit that this is
one interpretation of his opinion; but I am satisfied from the rest of what
he said that this is a misinterpretation of his entire statement. If I am
mistaken in this, Cardozo's view is, of course, much broader than I have
indicated above and would permit recovery in almost as many cases as
would the English view. The very fact that his opinion is open to this
plural interpretation, however, shows that it is not completely satis-
factory. But I can rest my version of his view on several other cases in
which liability is clearly denied because the evidence did not warrant the
inference of reasonable foreseeability of the hazard which caused the
plaintiff's damage. I might add at this point that I have always thought
that Cardozo's view does not always depend on foreseeability of the
hazard causing the harm if the evidence indicates that the plaintiff was
within range of the effect of the foreseeable hazard which made the de-
fendant's conduct negligent, as long as there is a substantial similarity
between the normal effect of the foreseeable hazard and a normal effect of
the unforeseeable hazard which actually causes the harm. But I have no
authority for this except the kindly approval of Mr. Cardozo himself in a
personal conversation.
Even.supposing my interpretation of Cardozo's view is correct, it is still
difficult to tell where we stand. In the first place, whenever the evidence
indicates that the hazard which caused the harm might have been reason-
ably foreseeable, the court has to submit this issue to a jury for resolution.
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And if, as is usually done, the jury is asked for a general verdict, the court
never knows whether or not the jury answered this specific query to the
effect that this hazard was reasonably foreseeable before it went on to the
rest of the issues. As long as the case gets to the jury, in spite of the
nature of the instructions required, practically the effect is much the same
whether it gets before that august body under one view or another. But
this is not all. Under Cardozo's view how are we ever to know in a close
case whether the evidence warrants the inference that the hazard which
actually caused the harm was reasonably foreseeable? After all, that is a
matter of opinion with respect to which judges might differ; and in making
such judgments they could not help being influenced by factors which
might dictate a particular result which they would find agreeable. Is it,
for instance, reasonably foreseeable that if surety bonds executed in blank
are left around where they might very likely be stolen, they will be
palmed off on creditors as authentic surety bonds by the thieves who pass
themselves off as agents of the defendant company?30 Is it reasonably
foreseeable that an owner of cattle will die as a result of a broken heart
because his cattle die from eating a negligently defective provender sup-
plied by the defendant?3' And is it reasonably foreseeable that a mother,
who from a point of safety sees her child negligently run down by an
automobile, will die of shock?32 After all, a federal circuit court of appeals
through a judge of no mean merit seriously declared that it could not
reasonably be foreseen that anyone not in privity with a manufacturer of
a chattel (not buying directly from the manufacturer) would be hurt by a
careless defect in the chattel, whereas it could be if privity of contract
were present. 3 On these issues and hundreds of others like them courts
have to decide under Cardozo's view whether or not a jury may be per-
mitted to say that the hazard causing the damage was a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of the admitted negligence of the defendant. Their
decisions on these matters are quite unpredictable.
Much the same sort of thing can be said of the so-called Pennsylvania
view or the "natural and probable consequences" rule as it is sometimes
called. How can anyone predict what a court will hold to be a foreseeable
consequence or eventuality of admitted negligence of some sort? The
Pennsylvania court in the Hoag case discussed above felt that the burning
of plaintiff's barn a quarter of a mile downstream could not be regarded
3o Benenson v. National Surety Co., 260 N.Y. 299, 183 N.E. SOS (1932).
31 Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937).
32 Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K. B. 141.
3 Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 12o Fed. 865 (C.C.A. 8th i9o3).
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as a foreseeable consequence of a train of oil cars being derailed by a
landslide across the tracks. But the New Jersey court felt otherwise in an
almost identical case. 34 For after all, the hazard of uncontrolled fire in the
country side seemed not improbable. The Pennsylvania court in the Wood
case discussed above felt that it was not a probable consequence of hitting
a person very hard at a crossing so that the body was thrown into the air,
that the body would strike someone nearby and hurt him. But the Ala-
bama court felt, at least, that it was a direct effect in a very similar case. 35
And in a recent case arising out of Pennsylvania in the federal court, the
judge felt that a jury could be permitted to infer that a probable result
of leaving dry ice (which expands 500 times in volume) in the street
might be a youngster's corking up some in a bottle which in turn would
explode, causing injury to another.3 6
The emphatically important role which foreseeability plays in these
views must be obvious to everyone. This is so, whether the inquiry be
with reference to foreseeability of the hazard, general or particular, which
causes the damage in suit, whether it be with reference to the conse-
quences of the negligence, the eventuality, or whether it be with reference
merely to the happening of some harm in order to establish negligence,
regardless of the hazard or consequences actually ensuing. How can any-
one possibly predict what a court may believe from the evidence to be a
sufficiently probable or likely hazard or consequence to warrant submis-
sion of the case to or keeping it from the jury? It all depends upon what
factors in the evidence a court is willing to isolate and emphasize for the
purpose of making this decision, which process in turn depends pretty
much on what outcome the court wishes to achieve or thinks to be politic.
This factor in the judgment process, in turn, is not usually a matter of
conscious choice but may be a function of the judges' accumulated experi-
ences in and observations of the world he lives in.
To illustrate what I am driving at, we may all agree that the death of a
housewife is hardly the reasonably probable consequence of delivering at
her backdoor a bottle of milk with a slightly jagged edge at the opening.
But if we stop to consider that a cut on the hand while removing the top
from such a bottle is quite foreseeable, the probability is greatly increased.
For cuts lead to infection and then to blood-poisoning, which in turn is
34 Kuhn v. Jewett, 32 N.J. Eq. 647 (i88o).
3s Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Chapman, 8o Ala. 615, 2 So. 738 (1887). And see Columbus
R. Co. v. Newsome, 142 Ga. 674, 83 S.E. 5o6 (igis). But it does not appear in these cases that
the courts thought the consequences were foreseeable. In fact, the Alabama court says that
recovery will be allowed in spite of lack of foreseeability.
36 New York Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Rataj, 73 F. (2d) 184 (C.C.A. 3d 1934).
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quite likely to result in dangerous illness or even death.37 Hurting a by-
stander as a result of striking someone at a railway crossing may be an
improbable consequence at first glance; but if we consider that a person
(or anything else) struck by a fast train is likely to be catapulted into the
air in almost any direction we immediately reflect that what goes up
generally comes down, and that in coming down it might easily hit some-
one who might foreseeably be standing near by. The death of an occupant
of a car which defendant carelessly but casually and with slight damage
bumps with his automobile is, to say the least, a strange consequence.
And even when it is explained that the death was brought about by shock
and fright, the result does not seem much more expectable. When what
happened is further refined, however, and it appears that the deceased
got out of her car to talk with the defendant about the collision and while
doing so, fainted and struck her head on the curb, we are not so sure about
the improbability of what happened. At least, we have to confess that
the hazard of shock and even its possible as well as its normal conse-
quences might reasonably have been foreseeable. But to reach the result
of the New York court, which permitted recovery of death damages, the
factors leading to recovery have to be carefully and sympathetically
isolated, indeed. 38 It is true, on the other hand, that the destruction of
goods by an entirely unforeseeable flood is definitely an unforeseeable
consequence of a negligent delay in forwarding a shipment of goods; and
it is hard to impose liability here except by employing a blanket rule like
the English or Andrew's view. But this is something else again.39
It cannot be too frequently repeated that we must not ask too much of
the concept of foreseeability, even after we have discounted it in light of
the remarks just made. For we must always remember that more than
the judge's actual experience and his knowledge of the world contribute
to his choice of the factors on which a chain of reasonable probability or
foreseeability may be based. What he thinks ought to be, what he wants
to see happen-in other words, his values and his notions of sound and
desirable social policy-are bound to play a large part in influencing his
choice or repudiation of the factors upon which a claim of probability or
foreseeability leading to liability may be created. And if a judge's func-
tion is to do justice, this, after all, is no more than we should expect.
To continue with criticisms of the judicial techniques of keeping neg-
3 Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (1926).
38 Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
39 If a natural destructive force such as a flood or frost is reasonably foreseeable, it becomes
one of the circumstances with respect to which the defendant's conduct should be judged.
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ligence cases from the jury, it is apparent that directed verdicts depending
on intervening agencies, human or otherwise, are not very satisfactory.
For the "intervening agency" might have been the very hazard the likeli-
hood of which made the defendant's original conduct negligent. Let me
refer again to the case where the defendant who has been making repairs
in the plaintiff's warehouse leaves the door open when he goes home from
work and during the night a thief enters and rifles the place. People lock
their doors to prevent such things from happening. On the other hand,
the intervening agency might be a natural phenomenon such as a flood or
high wind or even a normally running brook. If this natural agency is
quite unforeseeable, we might expect non-liability to follow. But where
it is normally a part of any natural environment it becomes merely one
of the circumstances with respect to which the defendants acted. But all
sorts of judicial reactions to these "intervening agencies" have occurred
in litigation and there is no way of predicting when a court is going to call
a brook, a wind or a frost an effective insulating "inteivening agency" or
a "cooperating agency" which is one of the expectable factors in a normal
environment. One is led to suspect that in making such judgments, courts
are frequently guided by subconscious desires to achieve certain ends on
the basis of considerations not involving the factor of intervening agencies.
The remaining important judicial technique of deciding the issue under
discussion is that employed by Andrews in his dissent from the majority
decision in the. Palsgraf case. His view is essentially the English view
with the very important qualification that a line has to be drawn some-
where. But the only guide he offers to help us in drawing this line is a
resort to "practical politics and a rough sense of justice." In other words,
it depends quite frankly upon how the judge in question feels about the
wisdom of permitting the imposition of liability by a jury in any par-
ticular case. Where the court feels that imposition of liability is permis-
sible, then, as a "matter of law" the defendant's negligence may be called
the "proximate cause" of the plaintiff's damage; otherwise it is the "re-
mote cause." Critics will have to admit that this view is engagingly hon-
est. An-dews makes no attempt to conceal the nebulous nature of the
judgment function at this point of negligence litigation. But he makes it
equally obvious that as far as predictability is concerned, there is no
possible helpful rule of thumb to guide one in making the judgment.
Administratively this view is not very desirable, for the judge is always
"on the spot." But one can hardly condemn this view because it compels
judges to isolate the nice point of a case and to pass on it frankly as a
matter of policy and expedience. One can simply feel sorry for the lawyer
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and student who are attempting to compile some general knowledge of
law which they can use in the future as a basis of predicting the probable
outcome of other cases.
V
Now this is by no means the whole story on the issue of proximate
cause, but it is a good place to make a few general remarks concerning
what courts do in deciding whether or not negligence cases should be
submitted to the jury for final disposition. Each view is loaded with con-
siderations of policy. Each view has administrative advantages or defects
from the point of view of ease in handling and certainty of prognostica-
tion. Each view has very little to do with actual cause in fact. And each
view is expressed in such exasperatingly general terms that we can never
be sure what it means or how it can be generally applied, its use being
certain only in the particular case in which it occurs. My continual use
of the word "view" in connection with these various alleged views un-
fortunately implies that each of them is a fairly definite view, with a
content that can be stated, understood and talked about with some de-
gree of assurance that each communicant knows what is going on in the
mind of the other. Now I obviously do not know what the English view is;
I have gathered what I have stated as the English view from three cases
and from the observations of trained men who have held this view
and have agreed upon this statement. If most of the profession is more or
less agreed upon what a particular view is, I will accept it for purposes of
discussion. At the same time, I reserve the right to revise my opinion
concerning what this view actually is. I suspect, for instance, that what
I have called the Cardozo and the Pennsylvania views are really the same
view, except that the former emphasizes those factors in a case which
might indicate that the result of defendant's negligence was probable or
foreseeable, whereas the latter ignores these clues and looks only at the
damage in light of normal expectancies. That is to say, under the Car-
dozo formula the step by step method might lead up to foreseeability of
what happened, whereas the eventuality itself might, without considera-
tion of the intermediate steps, seem quite improbable. But if the same
view is applied in two such dissimilar ways to a given case so that the
outcome of the case under one approach is submission to the jury and
under the other is a directed verdict for defendant, I think there is pretty
good reason to conclude that there are two views and not just one.
I can also imagine the statement that the English and Cardozo views
are much the same. 40 For thete is some indication in all three of the
40 See Green, Judge and Jury c. 8 (I9.0).
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English cases, on which this purported view is based, to show that neg-
ligence is not actionable unless it appears that it was negligence toward-
related to-the plaintiff. Of the Smith case it could be and has been said
that foreseeability of fire in the country side related the negligence to all
property owners, including the plaintiff, whom uncontrolled fire might
endanger. In the Polemis case it is clear that the admitted negligence of
dropping the plank was toward and related to some interest of the plain-
tiff. And in the Hambrook case, Lord Atkin, in stating the general rule of
extension of liability, remarks in part: "Once a breach of duty to the
plaintiff (italics mine) is established one has no longer to consider whether
the consequences could reasonably be anticipated by the wrongdoer."
If the argument referred to above-that Cardozo would permit imposi-
tion of liability wherever it appears that defendant was negligent with
respect to or toward the plaintiff-is put alongside this version of the
English view, certainly anyone choosing to conclude that the two views
are much the same could not be too severely criticized. My only answer
(and I fear it would be thrown back at me) would be that one adopting
this interpretation had read too much into the English cases and Mr.
Cardozo's opinion in the Palsgraf case.
At any rate, a discerning student should by this time have some notion
concerning what we are up against. These various views suggest embodi-
ments of general policies in dealing with negligence litigation. If we deal
only with the average types of cases that come up, by and large it doesn't
make much difference which view is employed to rationalize decisions,
since, with a few exceptions, the results will be fairly homogeneous any-
way. It is with respect to the odd or unusual cases that inconsistency in
result most frequently occurs. Perhaps we are not warranted in worrying
too much over the outcome of such cases. Perhaps the courts and legal
scholars are at fault in attempting to state the rules of extension of liability
so broadly as to include these unusual cases. On the other hand, it might
be vigorously and perhaps successfully maintained that these views we
have been talking about have been addressed exclusively to the odd and
unusual cases and that for the general run of negligence cases we do not
need any view or rule governing extension of liability for negligence since
the issue never assumes a position of any importance in them.
One feature of these rules or views which has been mentioned before is
their abstract nature and their assumption of general application. A stu-
dent reading them would suppose that a court decides all types of cases
on the basis of the same abstract approach, whether it involves auto-
mobiling, the sale of drugs, railroads, explosives, natural forces, and so on.
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And in a way, he would be correct in this supposition. For all one can tell
in reading what judges write in their opinions and what most legal
scholars say in their articles and books, these rules are thought by the
courts to apply generally regardless of the factual and social nature of the
cases before them. But it is pretty hard to believe that this is actually so.
The factual context of this issue and notions of strict or moderate liability
depending upon whether or not something of unusual danger has occurred
or the case involves an enterprise which is thought best able to bear loss4'
or which is not as economically or socially desirable as some others,
probably play a greater part in extension of liability for negligence than
most of us realize. This does not mean that courts are conscious of this
sort of influence in the application of general principles to particular cases,
if such an influence is indeed operative. It is simply an attempt to draw
attention to a matter which has occasionally been remarked on by others.
Consideration of this possibility is salutary enough, since if it is not true
there are some pretty good arguments why it should be and why judicial
consideration of extension of liability should be addressed to the facts of
life and society in specific type situations rather than to the general appli-
cation of a general abstract proposition to all kinds of social situations.
VI
Some mention appeared above concerning a judicial technique of avoid-
ing the so-called issue of proximate cause where literal application of the
formula approved by the court in question would probably result in
liability. Take, for instance, the case where defendant so manages his
automobile that a child is negligently injured or killed and its mother
who hears about it or sees it happen from a position of safety suffers shock
as a consequence from which she dies or has a miscarriage or serious
breakdown. The hazard of injury or death to the child on the street or
sidewalk is a foreseeable consequence of careless driving. So also, it has
been held, is shock and possible death to the mother who sees or hears
about the calamity; at least she or her administrator has been permitted to
recover in such a case.42 The Nebraska Supreme Court is willing to extend
this notion to the cattle owner who died of anguish over their negligently
caused deaths.43 The rescue cases are not much different from this, the
emotion aroused in that type of case by the defendant's negligence being
not shock and anguish but the altruism which impels another into the
4' See Feezer, Capacity To Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort
Cases, 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 8o5 (i93o).
42Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K. B. 141.
43 Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937).
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field of danger.44 Courts could dispose of these cases either way, for de-
fendant or plaintiff, by application of one of these formulae of proximate
cause or extension of liability for negligence. But they might also dodge
these formulae and dispose of them under the duty issue. The Wisconsin
court, in a suit for death of a mother who, from a window, saw her child
killed in the street by the defendant's automobile, refused to follow the
Hambrook case and held that defendant have a directed verdict. 45 Wick-
hem in his opinion stated that the English court reached its result under
the proximate cause formula, but that the Wisconsin court preferred to
decide the case in terms of duty. He then declared that in Wisconsin the
duty of a motorist to exercise care is confined to those who are in the street
or beside it and who are normally endangered by automobiling, leaving
the more definite scope of this duty to future decisions as cases arise.
Another beautiful example of a case in which the court admitted that it
was not only possible but also customary to impose or reject liability
under either the "proximate cause" or "duty" issue or both is Comstock v.
Wilson. 46 In that case defendant had carelessly bumped deceased's car,
causing slight damage. The deceased alighted to talk with the defendant
and while doing so fainted as a consequence of the shock, striking her
head on a curbstone. The court permitted recovery, dealing with both
issues favorably to -the plaintiff, although it is apparent that a contrary
decision might easily have been rationalized under a narrower conception
of either duty or proximate cause. It is interesting to wonder what the
Wisconsin court would have done in this case and in In re Guardian
Casualty Co.4 7 In that case two cars negligently driven collided so that
one went across the sidewalk striking a stone arch over a driveway. When
this car was removed by a wrecker about half an hour later, a stone from
the archway which had been loosened by the collision fell and killed the
owner of the building who had come to see what was going on. The issue
before the court was the responsibility of two insurance companies under
policies issued to the negligent drivers, protecting them from liability for
injuries to others caused by their careless driving of automobiles.
The idea that most cases in which the issue of proximate cause pre-
dominates might just as easily be decided under the duty issue is by no
means new. If the terms and approaches of "duty" and "proximate cause"
are regarded as merely conventional ways of talking about legal liability,
44 Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
4S Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
46 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
47 253 App. Div. 360, 2 N.Y. S. (2d) 232 (x938).
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it follows that either manner of speech can be employed with respect to
the issue of extension of liability for negligence in almost any case. In fact,
it is frequently asserted that if the disposition of negligence litigation is
ever to become understandable and be put on a common basis in all juris-
dictions, courts will have to adopt a new approach more or less along the
duty issue line for solution of the problem of extension of liability for
negligence.
Suppose, therefore, that courts begin with the proposition that the law
of negligence is a series of rules of protection, the sanction behind which is
the imposition of civil damages. Then, instead of saying that if a de-
fendant is negligent and his negligence contributes to plaintiff's damage,
liability will follow, suppose the court determines the scope of protection
guaranteed by the observance of care in particular fact situations and
inquires whether or not the evidence indicates that these rules of protec-
tion were violated. 48 We would then have hundreds of decisions in which
courts asserted that the conduct involved was required under the cir-
cumstances to be undertaken with "due care" (according to normally
recognized methods of pursuing this conduct as most people pursue it) in
order to avoid the normally foreseeable dangers attendant upon a failure
to exercise care. Courts would ask: "Why do we call this conduct neg-
ligent and why do we require the exercise of care? What is the purpose of
this rule of protection? Against what risks (dangers, hazards) do we main-
tain this guarantee?" Something akin to the so-called "legislative purpose
doctrine" which is employed in basing liability on breach of a criminal
safety statute would be invoked.49 The net result of this would be the
isolation and uncovering in each negligence case of the social problem in-
volved and the exercise of the court's notions of policy with respect to
this problem.
But I think that we would be deceiving ourselves if we really believed
that under this approach we had anything different from what we already
have under what I have been calling the Cardozo approach. Furthermore,
we would eventually be no better off than we are now, for some courts might
take a broad and others a narrow view of the scope of protection afforded
by the requirement of due care in any fact situation. Presently we would
have some courts declaring that the rule of protection guaranteed safety
against any consequences of a foreseeable hazard and others, only against
48 This is substantially what Green recommends in his books and articles. See his Ra-
tionale of Proximate Cause.
49 On this see Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action in Selected Essays on the Law of
Torts 276 (1924). Observe the technique of Cardozo, J., in De Haen v. Rockwood Sprinkler
Co., 258 N.Y. 350, 179 N.E. 764 (1932).
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foreseeable or probable eventualities or consequences themselves, regard-
less of foreseeability of the hazard causing the harm. Then courts adopting
either one of these views would differ as to which hazards they thought
were foreseeable in particular conduct or what eventualities they con-
sidered probable and how this probability should be determined. The
upshot, I fear, is that the issue remains the same, no matter what we call
it or how we analyze it, and the "escape mechanisms" will also remain the
same, whatever we call them, ready to be invoked whenever particular
courts dislike the literal implications of their particular formula for exten-
sion of liability for negligence.
VII
Of the leading essays on proximate cause I have little to say.50 Most of
them speak for themselves. The positive programs suggested in some of
them, explorations into the world of fiction and fancy completely un-
related to the ways in which practical men think, are to me utterly in-
credible. Edgerton and Green alone seem to have any practical apprecia-
tion of the problem, but the former, I believe, makes the mistake of taking
Beale's essay too seriously, is too sure of the correct policy behind the
extension of liability for negligence, and greatly exaggerates the role
which the jury plays in resolving this so-called issue of proximate cause.
In my opinion Green sets up too elaborate an analysis and is also rather
sure of the correct policy to govern extension of liability for negligence.
Furthermore, he goes out of his way to be deferential to Smith's "sub-
stantial factor" formula, although he is quite aware that this has nothing
to do with the main issue under discussion and is only a set of words with
which to submit the simple cause in fact issue to the jury after the im-
portant issue for the court has already been decided in the plaintiff's favor.
Perhaps Smith's essay has had more influence than any other and is
generally conceded to be the most authoritative account. This puzzles me
since I find it hard to believe that Smith fully appreciated what the real
problem of proximate cause is. He is not greatly troubled about extension
of liability for negligence, which is the only thing that troubles me. He
says that the correct view is to impose liability for negligence which is a
substantial causal factor in bringing about the harm in suit, essentially
what I have called the English view. His chief worry is how to submit the
case to the jury. But this is not the problem concerning which most of the
essays on proximate cause have been written or upon which most of the
outstanding decisions on proximate cause have been made. This is a
simple cause in fact issue; and if the court has decided to submit a case
to the jury, it has already decided in the plaintiff's favor the only real
so Most of these are cited in note 3 supra.
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issue of proximate cause with which I am familiar. It is true that under,
say, the Cardozo view, there may be some doubt concerning the reason-
able foreseeability of the hazard which caused the harm in suit. In such a
case, in contrast to the Palsgraf case where there was no doubt on this
feature, the court will submit the case to the jury with instructions that
the verdict is to be for the defendant as long as it finds that this hazard
was not reasonably foreseeable, in spite of additional findings that there
was negligence of some sort which did contribute to the harm. But this is
different from the proximate cause issue before the jury which Smith
writes about.
He deplores the "but for" formula and suggests that if a case gets to
the jury, it be instructed on negligence and then be told that if the
negligence was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the damage, the
verdict shall be for the plaintiff.-' It would, of course, be hard to disap-
prove of this recommendation, although I see nothing wrong with the
"but for" rule as a means of accomplishing the same purpose. Certainly,
if the plaintiff's damage would not have occurred, but for the defendant's
negligence, most people would probably regard it as a substantial con-
tributing factor. But since the "but for" rule is inadequate in a few spe-
cialized types of cases,5 2 its general application is certainly questionable.
Use of the words "proximate cause" in the charge to the jury is unfortu-
nate since it merely perpetuates the illusion that the issue before the jury
is the same one which the court has already passed on under that name.
This procedure might puzzle many, although it probably doesn't make
much difference to the jury unless the judge attempts to define proximate
cause in his instructions, in which case the jury will only be confused.
It is hard to believe that a good appellate court could get hopelessly
mixed up in applying Smith's substantial factor test. But that seems to
be what happened in Mahoney v. Beatrman, 3 where judge Wheeler ap-
parently read a great deal into the words "substantial factor" which many
others have been unable to perceive. In that case the plaintiff was driving
s, In this connection it is interesting to note that Professor Smith was one of the court in
Gilman v. Noyes, 57 N.H. 627 (1876) and that he wrote a concurring opinion.
s2 Cases of this sort are Corey v. Havener, I82 Mass. 25o, 65 N.E. 69 (igo2) and Kingston
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 191 Wis. 61o, 211 N.W. 913 (1927) in which it appears that the harm
might easily have occurred "but for" the defendant's negligence, that is, some other similar
hazard might easily have caused the harm; yet if the evidence indicates that the defendant's
negligence was contributing thereto or would have caused it alone, then the defendant may
be held liable anyway, despite the fact that the other hazard would have caused the harm.
This is a very interesting point which is adequately discussed in most of the leading essays on
proximate cause; but I do not wish to discuss it because it involves an essentially different issue
from that which is being explored in this article.
S3 IXo Conn. 184, 147 AtI. 762 (1929).
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a Rolls-Royce south at an unreasonably fast speed. Defendant, driving
north, negligently pulled across the road, forcing the plaintiff's right
wheels onto the shoulder. The hub cap of their left wheels and their
fenders touched, causing $2oo damage to the plaintiff's car. The plaintiff
went on for 125 feet and then lost control of his car, chiefly because of his
great speed, hitting a stone wall and suffering $5000 more damage to his
car. The case was tried without a jury and the court found defendant
negligent but entered judgment for only $200 (caused by the contact of
the cars) denying judgment for the rest of the damage apparently because
of plaintiff's contributory negligence.54 The plaintiff appealed and secured
a reversal with instructions to have judgment entered for full damages of
$50oo plus. The court made this the occasion for a long discussion of
proximate cause in which it confessed the itter confusion among judges
and writers on the subject. It went on to say that Smith's substantial
factor test was the best rule and declared that since the evidence showed
that defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing all of the
damage suffered, he should assume liability therefor. A dissenting justice
tried his best to show that the real issue was the plaintiff's negligence and
that the court should consider why traveling at sixty miles an hour was
negligent. He felt that if one of the hazards to be avoided by requiring
observance of a reasonable speed in motoring was loss of control of the car
in normally foreseeable exigencies and if the loss of control contributed to
(was a substantial factor in bringing about) the additional damage, as it
undoubtedly was, the plaintiff's recovery should be confined to the
damage resulting from the contact alone.55
S4 The trial court found, among other things, that "(2) the speed of plaintiff's car was un-
reasonable but it did not contribute to the collision which was due entirely to the negligence
of the defendant, (3) the speed did, however, materially hamper plaintiff's chauffeur in con-
trolling the car after the collision and owing to it he completely lost control of it."
Note the two excerpts from the dissenting opinion of Maltbie, J.: "With reference to the
particular case before us, I am not able to see how the discussion in the majority opinion is
involved at all. The decision of the lower court did not go upon the theory that there was any
actus interveniens but upon the theory that there was negligent conduct on the part of the
plaintiff's driver which while it did not proximately contribute to produce the accident still
did result in greatly increasing the damage from it.
"It is true, as the majority opinion points out, that the finding of the trial court is only that
the plaintiff's car before the injury was proceeding at an unreasonable speed. Upon a strict
construction of the finding it might be said that this statement falls short of charging the
driver of the plaintiff's car with negligent conduct and so the conclusion of the trial court fails
of support even as regards the principle it adopted. This situation, however, would call, not
for a remanding of the case with direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff for all the injuries
following upon the accident, but for remanding it to be proceeded with according to law."
s See Harper, The Law of Torts 299 (1933); see also Green, Mahoney v. Beatman: A
Study in Proximate Cause, 39 Yale L. J. 532 (1930).
PROXIMATE CAUSE
I suggest that no more eloquent commentary can be made on Smith's
substantial factor test and its effectiveness in solving the issue under
discussion in this article than the mere statement of the decision and opin-
ions just referred to. My account is, of course, very synoptic; but refer-
ence to the report of the case will supply any deficiencies.
Anyone reading this far may complain that my treatment of the essays
in this field has been rather summary and that I have exposed myself to
adverse criticism on several grounds. But I stand on the position that I
am trying to protect first-year students against the bewildering accounts
of proximate cause which have been in vogue for some years. I mistrust
most of these essays and their authors' attempts to resolve the issue under
fire. I agree with Edgerton and Green that there is no easy road to certain
prediction through the help of general rules, "workable" or otherwise, and
that in the last analysis the courts must, within very broad premises of
policy, decide what is just in each case. It has never occurred to me that
my knowledge of the issue under discussion is superior or that my ideas
are particularly original. I am simply stating my own opinion and views
for what they are worth.
VIII
This discussion is long and rambling. It has been a process of getting
something off my chest. I may have contributed something to the isola-
tion of the considerations which courts must entertain in determining the
extension of liability for negligence. I hope I have stated the issues which
I believe law students should be aware of. But I know that I have solved
nothing and, indeed, I had not set out to do so. As a positive program of
my own I can only emphasize the distinction between the functions of the
judge and jury in dealing with their respective issues which commonly
travel under the same name of "proximate cause"; and I cannot end
better than by repeating the famous statement from Street on Founda-
tions of Legal Liability:56
"The terms 'proximate' and 'remote' are thus respectively applied to
recoverable and non-recoverable damages ..... It is unfortunate that no
definite principle can be laid down by which to determine this question.
It is always to be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed con-
siderations of logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent .....
The best use that can be made of the authorities on proximate cause is
merely to furnish illustrations of situations which judicious men upon
careful consideration have adjudged to be on one side of the line or the
other."
S6 I Street, Foundations of Legal Liability iio (i9o6).
